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Putin's Warpath Goes Through Arctic
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news:* * *
Putin's Warpath Goes Through Arctic
By Pavel K. Baev
Executive Summary:
* Russia's war in Ukraine remains in a stalemate, with recent ceasefire hopes fading due to Russian President Vladimir Putin's inflexible demands amid negotiations on reducing hostilities in the Black Sea.
* Moscow has shifted its focus to operations in the Arctic and aims to rekindle strategic dialogue with the United States, offering Arctic cooperation despite Russia's deteriorating infrastructure and ecological risks.
* The sustained ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news: * * * Putin's Warpath Goes Through Arctic By Pavel K. Baev Executive Summary: * Russia's war in Ukraine remains in a stalemate, with recent ceasefire hopes fading due to Russian President Vladimir Putin's inflexible demands amid negotiations on reducing hostilities in the Black Sea. * Moscow has shifted its focus to operations in the Arctic and aims to rekindle strategic dialogue with the United States, offering Arctic cooperation despite Russia's deteriorating infrastructure and ecological risks. * The sustainedconcentration of Russian economic and human resources on waging its war against Ukraine has been detrimental to its Arctic development plans.
Russia's war against Ukraine is stuck in a rigid deadlock. The prospect of agreeing on a ceasefire, which had appeared within reach a couple of weeks ago, has, however, become distant and blurred. Russian President Vladimir Putin is not procrastinating or bargaining, he deliberately persists with unfeasible conditions while accepting concessions as a matter of routine (Re: Russia, March 27). This uncompromising position led to little progress gained from the tri-lateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks in Saudi Arabia on reducing hostilities in the Black Sea (Carnegie Politika, March 27). An agreement should have been possible because Ukraine consistently refrains from attacking tankers of the Russian "shadow fleet" with its naval drones, but Moscow demands more concessions while refusing to cease missile strikes on Odesa (see EDM; Novaya gazeta Europe, March 28). At the end of the week, Putin expeditiously shifted the focus of political maneuvering from the Black Sea to the Arctic.
The annual forum "The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue" in Murmansk, held on March 27, used to be a meeting place for international stakeholders, but it has been reduced to a podium for Putin's rhetoric (see Panorama, March 21; Izvestiya, March 28). Russia is excluded from all formats of international cooperation, and its partnership with the People's Republic of China (PRC) yields few benefits. Consequently, Putin made a rare admission that the model for developing the Northern Sea Route was unworkable (Kommersant, March 27). He did not mention that the production of natural gas was fast contracting and Gazprom's market value was sinking (Lenta.ru; RBC, March 28). In Putin's mind, these economic setbacks are of scant significance compared to the main source of Russia's strength in the Arctic--the Northern Fleet.
The highlight of Putin's visit was the launch of the newly built nuclear submarine Perm, armed with hypersonic Tsirkon missiles (TopWar.ru, March 27). This missile was designed as an anti-ship armament for various naval platforms, but Putin described it as a strategic weapon system (Interfax, March 27). His usual bragging contained a hint of interest in resuming conversations on strategic stability with the United States, which Moscow had rejected since the start of its war against Ukraine as incompatible with the stormy atmosphere of confrontation (Valdai Club, March 18). The Kremlin may be skeptical about U.S. President Donald Trump's ideas for reducing nuclear arsenals, but it is keen to open a channel of communication on strategic nuclear matters, where Moscow and Washington, D.C. can discuss issues as equals (RIAC, February 12; MK.ru, March 3).
This traditionally pivotal channel could be part of a broader dialogue on Russia-U.S. cooperation, in which Putin attempts to engage Trump despite the apparent failure to bring his war against Ukraine to an end (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 23). Joint ventures in the Arctic are offered as a lucrative opportunity, even if Russia insists on exercising complete control over such projects, which is a significant disincentive for potential PRC investors (Vedomosti, March 27). Putin described Trump's plans for gaining control over Greenland as "serious" and asserted that Russia had no objections to such a reconfiguration of sovereign rights in the Arctic (RBC, March 27). What makes this hypothetical proposition practically useful for Russia is the apparent escalation of tensions between the United States and Denmark, which has the potential of deepening discord in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see EDM, January 21; Svoboda.org, March 12; Interfax, March 28).
Expecting these tensions to deepen, Russia is putting pressure on the Northern European states, targeting Norway with a demarche against its alleged "militarization" of the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) archipelago (see EDM, March 20; 24TV.ua, March 26). The Nordic states, together with the Baltics, are, however, the strongest proponents of collective defense build-up and supporters of Ukraine, and Putin's threats to Finland and Sweden are only reinforcing their resolve (Fontanka.ru, March 27). Moscow is alarmed by European plans for rebuilding military strength and the defense industrial base, in which Ukraine figures not as a net recipient but as a significant contributor (TopWar.ru, March 27). Russian designs for splitting trans-Atlantic unity have always presumed that Europe would be demoralized and divided by the withdrawal of U.S. security commitments. Now, however, it faces the prospect of a re-energized Europe, in which the Nordic-Baltic determination to deter Russia's ambitions is backed by the collective leadership provided by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 26).
The Kremlin describes this dynamic as threatening Russia's security and insists that a pause in combat operations would play into the hands of the European "war party." Putin thus told submariners of the Northern Fleet to ignore the speculation about a "peace deal" (Kommersant, March 28). His plan for ending the war aims at defeating Ukraine, even if Russia's relentless attacks yield diminishing territorial gains (The Insider, March 29). In Russian society, to the contrary, hopes for a swift end to the war are rising and fueling the uptick in positive outlooks (see EDM, January 13; Re: Russia, March 28). In the economy, consumer confidence has increased, while inflation has decreased slightly, despite the decline in oil revenues, and the defense industry has exhausted its growth potential (The Moscow Times, March 28). A relaxation of the sanctions regime is the main focus of Moscow's optimistic expectations, but sober voices are warning about numerous hurdles on the path to restoring a modicum of economic normalcy in Russia (Forbes.ru, March 28).
Putin's pretense for readiness to bring the war to an end is negated by his own war-mongering rhetoric (see EDM, February 3). The Kremlin seeks to downplay this intransigence and to create incentives for bilateral Russia-U.S. rapprochement along other political and economic tracks, including the Arctic. The problem with this intrigue is that the failure to stop the deadly hostilities is plain and obvious, while the profits to be harvested from the vaguely outlined Arctic cooperation are hypothetical and mostly fictitious.
The enormous and sustained concentration of Russian economic and human resources on waging the war of attrition against Ukraine has been detrimental to its Arctic development plans. Launching new nuclear submarines is not a solution to the problems of deteriorating infrastructure, even in military bases. The neglect of accumulating ecological problems, including those resulting from nuclearization of the Arctic, generates risks that will inevitably undercut all geopolitical fantasies (see EDM, March 4).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/program/putins-warpath-goes-through-arctic/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: If NY Doesn't Amend Discovery Laws, Proverbial 'Broken Windows' Will Remain Broken
NEW YORK, April 1 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 30, 2025, to the New York Post:* * *
If NY Doesn't Amend Discovery Laws, Proverbial 'Broken Windows' Will Remain Broken
By Hannah E. Meyers
New Yorkers are fed up with crime and disorder.
Recent polling shows that public safety is the top concern for Gotham voters in this fall's mayoral race--and with good reason. Rates for major, violent and property crimes all remain between 25% and 30% above 2019 levels. Meanwhile, low-level offending, from evading fare to punching strangers, has turned ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, April 1 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 30, 2025, to the New York Post: * * * If NY Doesn't Amend Discovery Laws, Proverbial 'Broken Windows' Will Remain Broken By Hannah E. Meyers New Yorkers are fed up with crime and disorder. Recent polling shows that public safety is the top concern for Gotham voters in this fall's mayoral race--and with good reason. Rates for major, violent and property crimes all remain between 25% and 30% above 2019 levels. Meanwhile, low-level offending, from evading fare to punching strangers, has turnedstreets, stores and subways into zones of danger and distrust.
But in order to effectively combat this degradation, New York must first confront the false narrative that "small" crimes don't matter. This idea has been growing for the past decade -- enabled (ironically) by the increasing safety created through "broken windows" policies that specifically enforced these quality-of-life crimes. New Yorkers came to feel so safe that they could indulge in the illusion that the criminal justice system needn't bother imposing consequences for anything short of horrific felonies.
And so, we started enacting state laws that made it literally impossible to punish low-level offenses. But low-level crimes do matter: They have victims, reduce trust between citizens -- and inevitably feed more dangerous offending.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2025/03/30/opinion/its-time-to-protect-new-yorkers-and-amend-discovery-laws)
Hannah Meyers is director of the policing and public safety initiative at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/if-ny-doesnt-amend-discovery-laws-proverbial-broken-windows-will-remain-broken
[Category: ThinkTank]
ICYMI: Americans Say They're Worse Off Under Trump, Unhappy With Admin's Lack of Focus on Lowering Prices
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- Groundwork Collaborative, a think tank and progressive advocacy group, issued the following news release:* * *
ICYMI: Americans Say They're Worse Off Under Trump, Unhappy With Admin's Lack of Focus on Lowering Prices
Forecasters Raising Recession Odds; Markets Tumbling with Tariff Chaos
New polling from CBS News reveals a striking shift in how Americans view President Trump's handling of the economy. In January, 42% of Americans believed the president's policies would make them better off financially. Now, just over two months into his second term, that number has flipped ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 1 -- Groundwork Collaborative, a think tank and progressive advocacy group, issued the following news release: * * * ICYMI: Americans Say They're Worse Off Under Trump, Unhappy With Admin's Lack of Focus on Lowering Prices Forecasters Raising Recession Odds; Markets Tumbling with Tariff Chaos New polling from CBS News reveals a striking shift in how Americans view President Trump's handling of the economy. In January, 42% of Americans believed the president's policies would make them better off financially. Now, just over two months into his second term, that number has flipped- 42% believe he's making them worse off.
Groundwork Collaborative's Executive Director Lindsay Owens reacted with the following statement:
"Trump is failing abysmally on the core promise he campaigned on: to lower prices for working families. American consumers are rightly upset that instead of making rent and groceries affordable, he's enacting policies that push prices higher and drive the country into a recession.
"With prices continuing to rise, tariff threats causing chaos, and the GOP laser-focused on gutting Social Security and Medicaid to pay for billionaire tax breaks, it's no surprise Americans are worried about where this Administration is headed."
Email press@groundworkcollaborative.org to speak with a Groundwork expert about President Trump's handling of the economy.
BACKGROUND
* President Trump is underwater on the economy. The majority of Americans surveyed by CBS News disapprove of Trump's handling of the economy and inflation.
* 64% of people surveyed said the president isn't focusing enough on lowering prices, while 55% said he is focusing too much on tariffs.
* In January, 42% of Americans believed the president's policies would make them better off financially. Just over two months into his second term, that number has flipped - 42% believe he's making them worse off.
* Moody's Analytics Chief Economist Mark Zandi has raised his odds for a recession this year to 40%, after putting the odds at only 15% in January. This follows a swath of worrying economic data, including worsening consumer confidence, weaker consumer spending, and sticky inflation.
* Investment firm Goldman Sachs has hiked its 12-month recession odds to 35%, up from 20% earlier this year, and has slashed their S&P 500 target.
* Today, the S&P 500 and Nasdaq hit six-month lows on fears of President Trump's tariff chaos.
* The University of Michigan's Consumer Sentiment Survey found that consumers' expectations for the future health of the economy are now at their lowest level since 2022.
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Original text here: https://groundworkcollaborative.org/news/icymi-americans-say-theyre-worse-off/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Georgian Dream and the People's Republic of China Pursue Strategic Relationship
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news:* * *
Georgian Dream and the People's Republic of China Pursue Strategic Relationship
By Beka Chedia
Executive Summary:
* Georgian Dream has shifted from an initially anti-People's Republic of China (PRC) stance to embracing the PRC's development model, formalizing ties through a strategic partnership signed in 2023.
* Bilateral trade and PRC investment have surged in Georgia, including a free trade agreement, infrastructure projects, and a spike in PRC company registrations and tourism.
* Pro-PRC sentiment is being ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news: * * * Georgian Dream and the People's Republic of China Pursue Strategic Relationship By Beka Chedia Executive Summary: * Georgian Dream has shifted from an initially anti-People's Republic of China (PRC) stance to embracing the PRC's development model, formalizing ties through a strategic partnership signed in 2023. * Bilateral trade and PRC investment have surged in Georgia, including a free trade agreement, infrastructure projects, and a spike in PRC company registrations and tourism. * Pro-PRC sentiment is beingpushed in Georgia through pro-government media, social networks, educational initiatives, and partnerships with ultra-right and pro-Russian groups.
* Georgian institutions are purchasing PRC surveillance technology, which has raised cybersecurity concerns as some of the technology is subject to regulation by the PRC's National Intelligence Law.
* Tbilisi is pushing Washington and Brussels aside to achieve success in Beijing and other authoritarian regimes, ensuring power and stability at home.
On March 18, Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili met with the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to Georgia to discuss the strategic partnership between the two countries. The Georgian president noted that free trade, strategic partnership, and a visa-free regime contribute to the further development of Georgian-Chinese relations, strengthening contacts between people, business ties, and economic cooperation (Imedinews.ge, March 18). Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party has shown support for the PRC development model in its third parliamentary term, despite having originally come to power with near anti-PRC sentiments in 2012.
Since Georgia signed a memorandum of strategic political and economic partnership with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2023, the impact on Georgia's ruling party has become noticeable (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Georgia, August 7, 2023; see EDM, August 10, 2023). A study of 61 pro-PRC sources on social media in Georgia published in March 2024 found that establishing close relations with the PRC is perceived as a "political masterstroke" and a means to counterbalance the "significant pressure exerted by the United States on Georgia" (Georgia Online, March 7, 2024).
After coming to power in 2012, Georgian Dream demonstrated an economic interest in cooperation with the PRC. Under the Georgian Dream, Georgia became the first country in the region to sign a free trade agreement with the PRC in 2017, with the document entering into force in 2018 (Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia, May 13, 2017). This contributed to a significant increase in the registration of PRC businesses in Georgia between 2018 and 2019 (National Statistic Office of Georgia, accessed March 26). From 2012 to 2024, 1,893 PRC companies were registered in Georgia. In 2024 alone, 291 new PRC companies were registered in Georgia (National Statistic Office of Georgia, accessed March 26). Under the previous governments from 1995 to 2012, only 451 companies founded by PRC citizens were registered in Georgia. In 2013 and 2024, the PRC invested approximately $655 million in Georgia, which is five times the investment amount under the previous Georgian government (2003-2012), when only $132 million was invested (Transparency.ge, March 1).
Under Georgian Dream, the turnover of goods between the two countries has almost tripled. In 2012, total goods turnover amounted to $640 million, comprising $26 million in exports and $614 million in imports. By 2024, this figure had increased to $1.916 billion, with $303 million in exports and $1.613 billion in imports (Transparency.ge, March 1). Since 2024, Georgia has seen a modest increase in interest from PRC citizens in the country's real estate market. In particular, as local real estate experts explain, among foreigners, the main interest in Georgian real estate comes from Russians and Belarusians, and growing interest has appeared from Chinese investors (Business Media, August 4, 2024).
There were a record number of 88,583 visitors from the PRC recorded in Georgia in 2024, according to the Georgian National Tourism Administration (1tv.ge, January 15). In 2012, there were 12 times fewer visitors (7,633) (Transparency.ge, March 1). The sharp increase in visitors from the PRC is primarily due to the abolition of the visa regime for PRC citizens, as well as the intensification of direct air traffic between the two countries starting in 2023 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, May 30, 2024)
Georgia-PRC relations have been further strengthened with the establishment of new joint organizations. The Georgia-China Regional Cooperation (GCRC) Association was established in Tbilisi in January. The purpose of the GCRC is to establish new partnerships between Georgian and Chinese business organizations (Bm.ge, January 31). Before this, the Georgian-Chinese Friendship Association and the Georgian-Chinese Center for Economic and Cultural Development were also established (see EDM, October 7, 2021; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 7, 2023).
At the request of the Georgian Dream government, PRC companies have implemented major infrastructure projects worth hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars (Transparency.ge, March 1). In 2020, the Polish Ambassador to Georgia, Mariusz Mashkevich, questioned why Georgia was inviting PRC companies to build roads and tunnels, given that Georgia receives its main funding for infrastructure projects from EU countries (Radiotavisupleba.ge, December 6, 2020). Several large PRC state-owned companies are currently actively operating in Georgia (Bpn.ge, June 13, 2024). These companies are constructing roads and tunnels of strategic importance for Georgia, including the only highway connecting eastern and western Georgia. For example, in summer 2024, a 1,800-meter Rikoti tunnel was opened that had been constructed by Chinese companies. The local population expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of this tunnel, deeming it "'unsafe"' (Georgian Public Broadcaster, August 12; ifact.ge, November 28, 2024).
The signing of the Strategic Partnership between the PRC and Georgia in 2023 marked a shift from largely economic cooperation to broader political rapprochement (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Georgia, August 7, 2023). This occurred in parallel with the deterioration of relations with the West. By signing a strategic partnership with a geopolitical rival of the United States and the European Union, official Tbilisi sent a clear political message to the West that it will henceforth be friends not only with the West but also with the East. The text of the partnership agreement implies a shift away from liberal values and a recognition of the perceived superiority of the PRC's political and economic system. In particular, the agreement states, "'Georgia believes that Chinese modernization offers a new path and a new option for mankind to achieve modernization"' (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Georgia, August 7, 2023). Additionally, the agreement allows for visa-free travel and direct flights for Georgians to the PRC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, May 30, 2024).
The rapprochement with the PRC has afforded Georgian Dream an opportunity to compare Georgia's strategic partnership with the PRC to its strategic partnership with the United States. In 2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze criticized the United States for not introducing visa-free travel for Georgian citizens. He also criticized the lack of direct air travel from the United States to Georgia (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 23, 2024).
Georgian Dream has launched a full-scale propaganda campaign in local pro-government media to convince Georgian citizens, the vast majority of whom are pro-Western, of the advantages of the PRC-Georgian friendship. For the past few years, Georgian Dream has been actively promoting the PRC's economic and political model as an alternative to the liberal Western model of government. Georgian Dream propaganda has launched a campaign to shape the PRC's image as a country with an ancient civilization, hardworking and friendly to Georgia, a reliable partner that can replace the European Union as Georgia's strategic ally, while calling PRC President Xi Jinping a world leader (Georgia Online, March 7, 2024). A study published by a group of independent researchers in 2024 revealed that the Georgian Dream is disseminating pro-PRC propaganda through its media and social networks. At least 61 Georgian-based pro-PRC social media sources, including 18 authentic and 18 fake personal accounts, four Facebook groups, and 39 pages, were identified as sharing positive sentiments and messages related to the PRC (Georgia Online, March 7, 2024). Georgian Dream is actively utilizing pro-Russian and ultra-right groups, such as "People's Power," "European Socialists," "Georgia First," Alt-Info, as well as individual public figures, to popularize the PRC among the Georgian population (Georgia Online, March 7, 2024).
In 2023, before signing the strategic partnership, a video of a Chinese children's choir singing a Georgian song in Georgian went viral on Georgian social networks and media. The pro-government media used this video to claim that the PRC respects the Georgian language and culture, while the West, on the contrary, forces Georgian children to sing in English (YouTube/@NikolozMzhavanadze, April 28, 2023).
Propagandists within the Georgian ruling elite have also actively disseminated the message that the PRC will assist Georgia in restoring its territorial integrity (Georgia Online, March 7, 2024). At the United Nations General Assembly in 2024, however, the PRC did not take part in the voting to support the resolution to return Georgian refugees to the occupied regions (see EDM, June 11, 2024). Since 2008, Georgia has annually called a vote on a resolution, from which the PRC has traditionally abstained, that envisages the return of Georgian refugees to their homes in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region ("South Ossetia") (see EDM, June 11, 2024). The PRC's continued abstinence in this vote signals no change in its willingness to support Georgian territorial integrity.
Georgian state institutions are increasingly purchasing PRC-made surveillance cameras. According to Georgian observers, these cameras may pose cybersecurity and information leakage risks, as some of them are subject to regulation by the PRC's National Intelligence Law. According to Georgian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the largest buyer of PRC surveillance cameras is the Georgian Central Electoral Commission. This agency is often accused of involvement in the falsification of the 2024 parliamentary elections, including the use of surveillance cameras at polling stations to exert psychological pressure on voters. Just before the elections, the Central Electoral Commission purchased PRC-made surveillance cameras for a total of 1,694,368 Georgian Lari ($610,632) (Business Media, January 17). Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that the authorities are also using PRC-made surveillance cameras on the central avenues of the capital to identify participants in anti-government protests (TouTube/@studiomonitori, February 20).
Cultural and educational relations have also been a key area of cooperation between Georgia and the PRC. In July 2023, while visiting the PRC, then-Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili signed a memorandum of understanding in the educational sphere, according to which it was decided to actively introduce the teaching of the Chinese language in primary and secondary schools in Georgia (Publika.ge, July 28, 2023). In February, the PRC Ambassador to Georgia, Zhou Qian, visited the Georgian Ministry of Education and discussed "strengthening cooperation in the field of education and science" with the Georgian Minister of Education, Aleksandre Tsuladze (Facebook/Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of Georgia, February 7). At a meeting with the Georgian Ministry of Education, Zhou also discussed the issue of teaching Chinese in public schools in Georgia. Following this meeting, the education ministries of both countries announced that they are already working on a draft agreement on the mutual recognition of diplomas and certificates issued in the PRC and Georgia (Facebook/Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of Georgia, February 7).
PRC influence in Georgia began approximately 15 years ago under the pro-Western United National Movement party, headed by Mikheil Saakashvili. In 2010, the first Confucius Institute was established at one of the country's popular private universities, the Tbilisi Free University, to promote the study of the Chinese language and culture among Georgians (Freeuni.edu.ge, September 28, 2014). The establishment of the first institute was followed by the opening of other Confucius Institutes, which raised concerns in Georgia's civil sector. In 2020, local observers began to be alarmed that the PRC had started actively spending money to attract Georgian youth and was allocating scholarships for students to study at PRC universities. The PRC's involvement in Georgia's education sector has given some local observers cause to claim that all of this serves to popularize the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party among Georgians (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 6, 2020).
In the early years of its rule, Georgian Dream perceived its relations with the PRC in a contradictory manner. In 2015, then-Minister of Justice Tea Tsulukiani proudly announced the results of her large-scale migration reform, as a result of which the flow of visitors, including those from the PRC, was sharply reduced in 2014. She then proudly announced that Georgia had achieved some success in moving toward integration with the European Union (Netgazeti.ge, March 6, 2015). Since then, however, Georgian Dream has fully aligned with the PRC and departed from the West. Georgia is now pushing Washington and Brussels aside to achieve success in Beijing and other illiberal regimes in a way that ensures power and stability at home.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/program/georgian-dream-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-pursue-strategic-relationship/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for Strategic & International Studies: South Korea's Ongoing Political Crisis
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2025:* * *
South Korea's Ongoing Political Crisis
By Victor Cha and Ellen Kim
Last week was an eventful one in South Korea's ongoing political crisis. On March 24, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled to reinstate Prime Minister Han Duck-soo as acting president and acquitted him of impeachment charges. Two days later, the Seoul appellate court cleared Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) opposition party leader Lee Jae-myung of election fraud charges. The final act of this South ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2025: * * * South Korea's Ongoing Political Crisis By Victor Cha and Ellen Kim Last week was an eventful one in South Korea's ongoing political crisis. On March 24, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled to reinstate Prime Minister Han Duck-soo as acting president and acquitted him of impeachment charges. Two days later, the Seoul appellate court cleared Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) opposition party leader Lee Jae-myung of election fraud charges. The final act of this SouthKorean political crisis trilogy is yet to play out with the Constitutional Court's impending decision on President Yoon's impeachment. However, the verdict, while critical, will not arrest the political storm that the country has weathered for over 17 weeks. A decision to acquit or to impeach will not end the crisis; rather, it will merely propel the country to another stage of deepened political polarization.
Q1: What is the significance of the Seoul appellate court's decision to clear Lee Jae-myung of election fraud charges?
A1: The court's decision to clear Lee of election law violations allegedly committed during the 2022 presidential campaign paves the way for lawmakers to run for the presidency if a snap election is called in the coming months. Lee currently polls at 34 percent, which is 26 points higher than the top People's Power Party (PPP) ruling party candidate, Minister of Employment and Labor Kim Moon-soo (8 percent). The party will likely coalesce behind Lee, and this will remove any threat of splinter candidates running as independents that would split the progressive vote. Lee's preparation for the presidential election is evident in his "right-clicking," that is, tacking to the political center in order to supplement his progressive base of support with moderates and undecided votes so crucial for an electoral victory. Lee gave a series of interviews to the Western press in recent weeks in order to portray a more centrist agenda on foreign policy. For example, he disavowed any concerns that his presidency would reverse Yoon's reconciliation efforts with Japan and the trilateral allied cooperation among Yoon, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Biden. Whether such moderate policies will actually inform a Lee presidency remains to be seen.
The large gap in the polls does not ensure Lee's win. First, we will not have a true sense of the PPP's chances until a presidential candidate is selected, because only then will we see whether the dispersed support around 4-5 figures will coalesce around a single candidate. Second, Lee is undeniably a polarizing figure, and there is a strong "anti-Lee" sentiment that has not yet crystallized in polling numbers in support of the as-yet-unnamed PPP candidate.
Q2: What are the other legal cases against Lee?
A2: Also held in the balance over the election are an additional four criminal charges against Lee (See Table 1). There is a legal debate over whether Lee's election win would give him presidential immunity from prosecution or whether the cases would still need to be adjudicated since the alleged violations took place before the presidency.
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Table 1: Outstanding Legal Cases Against Lee Jae-myung
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Q3: Will the Constitutional Court decision--either reinstating Yoon or impeaching him--finally end the 17-week political crisis in South Korea?
A3: Unfortunately, no. A Constitutional Court decision that absolves Yoon of impeachment charges will allow him to return to office, but this will only deepen the political polarization rather than normalize the political environment.
The DPK and other opposition forces will direct all of their energy previously focused on impeachment to (1) impeding Yoon's ability to rule and (2) pursuing the criminal charges of treason against Yoon, which are due to start on April 14. Public outrage at the court's decision will explode, and anti-Yoon demonstrations will only grow more. The DPK-led National Assembly will block all of the administration's legislation, including the budget. The opposition will likely continue to pursue investigations and charges against First Lady Kim Keon Hee. There will be no peace and little political space for Yoon in his remaining time in office. Despite his reinstatement, Yoon's party may still see him as badly damaged and may render him a lame-duck status, focusing instead on finding the next conservative candidate for the 2027 election.
Should Yoon be impeached, the political crisis in South Korea will not be resolved either. Instead, the frenetic and divisive energy will move to the snap election, with DPK and PPP sides scrambling to campaign for the 60-day period. The opposition political forces will still pursue the criminal charges against Yoon as well.
For the PPP, Yoon's impeachment will propel hardcore Yoon supporters to the streets to protest the court decision as unjust. But the PPP's future would be unclear. The party could collapse from internal fighting after an impeachment, or it could hang together, in which case lawmakers would likely abandon the disgraced president and focus on fielding their candidate for the snap election. Unity will be difficult to maintain, however, and this could lead to independent candidacies, which would almost certainly cement a progressive victory with a unified candidate.
Q4: What are the implications of this protracted political crisis?
A4: In the two past cases of impeachment in South Korea (2004 and 2016-2017), the economy managed to weather the protracted political uncertainty as the stock market, investor confidence, and growth soon recovered. But as I have argued elsewhere, a number of external factors helped the post-impeachment recovery, including China's economic growth (in 2004) and the boom in semiconductor exports (in 2017). In 2025, however, the external environment is markedly different with developments--war, reciprocal tariffs, 25 percent tariffs on Mexico and Canada, steel and aluminum tariffs, and foreign car tariffs--that do not help South Korea's economic recovery.
Perhaps the most significant concern is the impact of this protracted political crisis on the U.S.-South Korea alliance. A government in stasis in Seoul, in combination with a new Trump administration that is moving rapidly to implement new policies, is fomenting a "quiet crisis" in the alliance. While Justin Trudeau, Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer, Shigeru Ishiba, and other world leaders have met with Donald Trump, the absence of a South Korean president has meant the leader-to-leader interaction that is so critical to dealmaking with Trump has not happened. Instead, South Korea has been hit with a bevy of U.S. tariffs, including on steel, cars, chips, and other items. Two working-level attempts at winning exemptions for the interim South Korean government have failed. The listing of South Korea on the Department of Energy's "sensitive country" list came as a surprise to Seoul and provides a bad optic for the alliance. Trump talks more about meeting with Kim Jong-un than he does about meeting with the next South Korean president. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth skipped Seoul on his first trip to the Indo-Pacific because, with limited time, it made no sense to meet with a counterpart who would not likely occupy the seat in a couple of months. In addition, once the Trump administration focuses on alliance issues with South Korea, Seoul will have to deal with U.S. demands for more cost-sharing, more defense spending, and potential changes to the U.S. force structure on the peninsula. None of these conversations can take place in earnest while South Koreans are fighting internally for their political future. And the most important conversations at the leader-level will not take place until the summer, at which point the United States may have already made policy decisions about the alliance and about North Korea without Seoul's consultation.
Victor Cha is president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Ellen Kim is senior fellow of the Korea Chair at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-koreas-ongoing-political-crisis
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for Strategic & International Studies: Ripple Effects of Vietnam's Island-Building in the South China Sea
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2025:* * *
The Ripple Effects of Vietnam's Island-Building in the South China Sea
By Harrison Pretat
In 2021, Vietnam began expanding some of its small- and medium-sized outposts in the Spratly Islands through dredging and landfill. As of now, that effort has resulted in over 2,200 acres of new land being created across ten features, with eight new harbors and one new airstrip completed thus far. The scale of Vietnam's island building is second only to China's, which created ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2025: * * * The Ripple Effects of Vietnam's Island-Building in the South China Sea By Harrison Pretat In 2021, Vietnam began expanding some of its small- and medium-sized outposts in the Spratly Islands through dredging and landfill. As of now, that effort has resulted in over 2,200 acres of new land being created across ten features, with eight new harbors and one new airstrip completed thus far. The scale of Vietnam's island building is second only to China's, which created3,500 acres of land in the Spratlys from 2013 to 2017. And, like China, Vietnam's dredging campaign will have permanent and far-reaching effects.
Deployments and Defense
Since China completed the expansion of its own artificial island bases in 2017, it has used those ports to operate continuous coast guard patrols and flotillas of maritime militia across the Spratlys. Vietnam's new outposts will offer similar logistical advantages, allowing ships to deploy to the islands for longer and keep better watch over far-flung outposts and protect against Chinese harassment of oil and gas activities at sea. But Hanoi's navy and coast guard are nowhere near the size of Beijing's, and fleet modernization has slowed to a crawl in recent years. This means that while Vietnam will now have the logistical capacity for longer deployments, it still doesn't have the number of ships needed to sustain anywhere near the pace of operations of China. Given this continued disparity, Hanoi may make use of its maritime militia to keep up its presence in the near term.
The expansion will also make the islets themselves more defensible. Many of the recently expanded outposts previously consisted only of isolated concrete structures with just enough space to house a dozen or so personnel. The transformation into full island bases will afford more real estate for anti-ship artillery and rocket systems, coastal defense emplacements, and additional radar and sensing capabilities. Despite these upgrades, it remains unlikely that Vietnam could hold the islands against a concerted Chinese effort to take them. But the cost of Beijing doing so would undoubtedly be higher, and any effort to dislodge the defenders would be a bloody affair that would be likely to escalate into a broader conflict.
Claimant Responses
Thus far, there has been little public response to Vietnam's island building, most surprisingly from China. Beijing has said virtually nothing in public save for a tepid restatement of China's claim over the area in February. And China's coast guard and militia, focused instead on harassing the Philippines, have made no effort to interfere with Hanoi's efforts. Beijing may have simply concluded that it won't be able to stop Hanoi without incurring an unacceptably high risk of escalation. And with the Philippines moving to dramatically revitalize its alliance with the United States and organize regional opposition to China's claims since 2022, Beijing may be especially wary of damaging its relations with Hanoi, lest it create an opportunity for a more unified response from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimants.
Those claimants, including the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have also remained relatively quiet about Vietnam's island building. No one anticipates that Vietnam will use its bases to restrict freedom of navigation or launch challenges to fishing or hydrocarbon activity. And, at least in the near term, neither the Philippines or Malaysia is likely to jump on the bandwagon and significantly expand their own outposts in the Spratlys, for different reasons: Manila cannot afford to abandon the moral high ground if it hopes to proceed with its planned legal challenges to China's claim, and Kuala Lumpur has historically been the last of the claimants to take any step that could be seen as provocative. But in the long term, the strategic consequences of Hanoi's expansion may be hard to ignore. If both Chinese and Vietnamese ships begin to operate from the Spratlys en masse, the Philippines may eventually decide that it, too, needs additional real estate at its outposts to support a more consistent presence for its coast guard. And if all the other claimants have them, Malaysia might begrudgingly follow suit to protect its oil and gas activity.
A Complication for Legal Challenges
Vietnam's reclamation does nothing to change the nature of Vietnam's territorial or maritime claims, or the legal status of the features themselves. It is also unlikely to make a major impact on negotiations for the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (COC) on the South China Sea, which have been stalled for two decades over more fundamental issues of geographic scope and whether the code is to be legally binding. But by joining China in using environmentally destructive cutter-suction dredgers to carve out thousands of acres of coral reef, Vietnam may have weakened one potential avenue the Philippines had been eyeing as its next step in seeking legal recourse against Beijing.
Frustrated with the lack of progress on the COC and facing increased harassment by China at sea, the Philippines filed and won an international arbitration case against China's claims in 2016. Since the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration entered office in 2022, Manila has rallied international support around that outcome and has declared its intent to mount a second legal challenge against Beijing. Currently, it is deciding between filing another case under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VII focused on the environmental destruction caused by China's activities, or a broader case to a different international platform, potentially the International Court of Justice.
Some recent remarks from Filipino Justice Secretary Crispin Remulla have hinted that Manila is leaning toward bringing the environmental case. But that option might be less appealing now that Vietnam is on pace to match China's level of dredging in the Spratlys. The actual case against China would still be sound--regardless of what Hanoi has done since, it is still an easily observable fact that China destroyed thousands of acres of coral reef through its own island building. But unless Manila also files a case against Vietnam, which it has no interest in doing, given Hanoi's otherwise helpful voice on South China Sea issues within ASEAN, the impact of environmental charges against China will be in question. Beijing will be quick to point out the difference in treatment and brand the case a cynical tactic of U.S.-led efforts to unfairly contain China. And though the second half of that argument is unlikely to find purchase in the region, the double standard will give countries who would prefer to remain on Beijing's good side an easy excuse to withhold their support for the proceedings. Even once the Philippines won its case, which it likely would given the preponderance of evidence, the ordeal might end, counterintuitively, with the Philippines effectively ceding some of the moral high ground that it has been successfully leveraging to build international support against China's claims.
Given this potential, Manila would be wise to consider the advantages of instead filing a broader case that looks at more than environmental issues. By filing a case that includes arguments against China's truly exceptional maritime claims, Manila could avoid the appearance of a double standard and make it easier to rally international support for its cause.
Harrison Pretat is deputy director and fellow with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ripple-effects-vietnams-island-building-south-china-sea
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for Strategic & International Studies: Effects of the Trump Administration's Tariff Threats Against Canada and Mexico
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2025:* * *
Effects of the Trump Administration's Tariff Threats Against Canada and Mexico
By Christopher Hernandez-Roy
President Trump's repeated on again, off again tariff threats against the United States' two largest trading partners, Canada and Mexico, along with his musings about making Canada the fifty-first state have rattled equity markets, created confusion and uncertainty, paused investment decisions, generated mistrust between erstwhile allies, and called the very ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2025: * * * Effects of the Trump Administration's Tariff Threats Against Canada and Mexico By Christopher Hernandez-Roy President Trump's repeated on again, off again tariff threats against the United States' two largest trading partners, Canada and Mexico, along with his musings about making Canada the fifty-first state have rattled equity markets, created confusion and uncertainty, paused investment decisions, generated mistrust between erstwhile allies, and called the veryviability of the North American project into question. The Trump administration's actions on North America are triggering a rethink in both Mexico and Canada of the wisdom of having so deeply integrated their economies with the United States. This may well lead to a loosening of bonds and cooperation in the North American bloc, with negative impacts on U.S. economic and national security, to the benefit of the country's adversaries.
The North American project, grounded in the 1988 U.S.-Canada Free Agreement, enlarged under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and modernized under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), sought to make North America the most prosperous and competitive region in the world. Trade among the partners has more than tripled since NAFTA entered into force. In 2024, U.S. trade with Mexico totaled an estimated $840 billion, and U.S. trade with Canada, meanwhile, totaled an estimated $762 billion. This $1.6 trillion trilateral trading bloc represents nearly 30 percent of global GDP, considerably larger than China's share and almost twice the European Union's share. The agreements led to deepening trade and investment governed by a set of reliable rules, integrated supply chains, and increased cultural and familial ties between the three nations, whose citizens felt they were building a future together.
However, President Trump's approach to the United States' neighbors threatens to unravel that history of trade, integration, and trust, as well as damage the economies of all three nations. Already, the consequences are visible in the reaction of the governments of Mexico and Canada, as well as in their citizens' individual actions. Both countries are thinking about how to find new trading partners, and Canada is talking about building new infrastructure on its coasts to access those markets, rather than the North-South infrastructure that has been built over the previous decades. While geography, existing long-term business ties, and U.S. consumption needs will ensure continued North American trade, it is possible, however, that Mexico and Canada, in particular, may begin a decoupling process. After the imposition of a 25 percent tariff on automobiles imported into the United States, to be implemented on April 2, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said on March 27 that "the old relationship [Canada] had with the United States based on deepening integration of our economies and tight security and military cooperation, is over."
Canada
Energy
The first place Canada will look to diversify markets is in energy. The country is the world's fourth-largest crude producer and relies on the United States as the market for 90 percent of its oil exports. Were it not for Canadian oil, the United States would have a trade surplus with Canada. This heavy crude is sold at a discount as there is insufficient infrastructure capacity to send it to markets other than the United States. In addition, U.S. refineries have been designed to process the heavy crude that exists in the Western Hemisphere, and they rely on Canada for 70 percent of the oil they refine. Since many are not built to refine the higher-value light crude that the United States produces from fracking, this light oil is sold on international markets.
On March 18, an open letter signed by 14 Canadian CEOs representing the four largest pipeline companies and 10 largest oil and natural gas companies was sent to the leaders of Canada's political parties. The companies argued that there was increasing public support to build energy infrastructure, including new oil and natural gas pipelines and liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals, to expand Canada's energy exports. What the letter didn't say was that the intended markets: Europe, India, East Asia, and China, not the United States (though Prime Minister Carney has pledged to diversify with like-minded countries in Europe instead of China). The prime minister has often spoken about the need to build new pipelines. A recent study suggests that Canada could divert $38.4 billion per year in oil and LNG exports away from the United States and send it instead to Europe and Asia if it built new pipelines to the east and west. The government of Quebec is actively reconsidering the idea of building a pipeline from Western Canada east through the province. The strong public opposition, which shelved previous efforts, has all but evaporated due to a spike in economic nationalism. Naturally it would take time to build new pipelines; but should they come to pass, not only would the United States lose its source of cheap heavy crude, but its refineries would either have to rely on oil from Venezuela, a dictatorship which is currently under primary and secondary U.S. sanctions (and now tariffs); or they would have to retool to process U.S. light crude. Either way, there would be a significant delay and a cost to U.S. refiners and consumers with higher prices at the pump.
Critical Minerals
As the author has argued in another paper, critical minerals should have been a strategic area of cooperation between Canada and the United States, given China's near-monopolistic control of certain minerals essential for the clean energy transition, consumer products like cell phones, and the U.S. defense industry. Now the mood has soured, and Canada is looking to other markets. In resource-rich British Columbia, the government of the province fast-tracked mining projects in February, hoping to use critical minerals as a powerful tool to buffer against the economic shocks of U.S. tariffs. As will be noted below, Canada is seeking closer ties to Europe, as the European Union approves Euros800 billion for urgent rearmament. Ottawa's ambassador to Rome has written to Italian authorities that Canada has much more to offer to help the Europeans rearm, including the integration of supply chains for Canada's large reserves of critical minerals needed for advanced defense technologies.
Interprovincial
Diversification, of a kind, will also happen within Canada. The threats to Canada's economy have galvanized efforts to end inter-provincial trade barriers within the country, which have existed since Canada's founding. These barriers increase costs for businesses and consumers, limiting economic growth. Provincial Premiers have agreed to work to eliminate the barriers and hope their efforts will add up to $200 billion to the Canadian economy. Prime Minister Carney has been even more optimistic, saying the economy could grow by $250 billion, which would be enough to offset U.S. tariffs; he promised to end all federal barriers to interprovincial trade by Canada's national holiday, July 1. Some economists are not so bullish, thinking the economy might only grow by half that amount.
Defense
Canada has quickly taken steps to begin reducing its reliance on the United States for equipment amid suggestions that Canada be cut from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Prime Minister Carney has ordered the Minister of Defense to review the agreement to purchase 88 F-35 stealth fighters and look at alternatives. There has been a groundswell of support among Canadians to cancel the $19 billion purchase, itself made after a torturous and controversial process, and find aircraft other than those manufactured and maintained in the United States. In addition, Canada appears to be in advanced talks to join the Europeans in their defense industrial expansion triggered by President Trump's ambivalence over NATO and his approach to ending the war in Ukraine. During his first overseas trip as prime minister, Carney visited France and the United Kingdom, where he discussed security cooperation with the French and British leaders. He also discussed Canadian participation in the efforts to rearm Europe with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in order to strengthen Canadian security networks beyond the United States and to boost Canada's defense industrial base. Under a Canada-European alliance, Canada could be a place where European allies train their forces, safely manufacture European fighter jets, military arms and munitions, and other critical technologies at its own industrial facilities.
Mexico
Perhaps because Mexico has a history of being pressured by the United States and has learned from those experiences, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, while publicly defiant, has kept her cool and her cards closer to her chest, unlike her Canadian counterparts. She has told her compatriots that "we must avoid confrontations . . . At the same time, we must behave as equals, never subordinates. We must defend our sovereignty, our independence, and defend the Mexican people." President Sheinbaum said Mexico would apply tariff and nontariff retaliatory countermeasures, without ever detailing what those would be. She has earned plaudits by not only confronting President Trump, but also by gaining the U.S. president's public respect.
Migration and Drug Trafficking
President Sheinbaum's strategy appears to be publicly tough but quietly deliver on the nontrade irritants the Trump administration wants Mexico to solve. Mexican officials were already deterring migration to the United States, and President Sheinbaum agreed to post an additional 10,000 Mexican National Guard troops on the border to help stem the human flow and the trafficking of fentanyl across the border. In December, the Mexican military made the largest seizure of fentanyl in the country's history, and two months later, President Sheinbaum extradited 30 jailed convicts or individuals accused of ties to violent drug cartels and of trafficking cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl into the United States. Some commentators, however, are beginning to criticize her approach as caving in to President Trump's demands.
Diversification Through Trade Agreements
While she has extolled the benefits of USMCA giving strength to North America and allowing it to compete successfully with other regions of the world, Sheinbaum has also warned that if the threatened tariffs are maintained, Mexico would have to diversify its economy and would also look to attract foreign investment. In fact, Mexico is already taking small steps to diversify its trade. In 2024, it increased its exports to several Asian countries and Hong Kong, with double-digit percentage increases in its exports to destinations such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan, despite still sending the vast majority of its trade to the United States. The president of the National Association of Importers and Exporters of Mexico, Gerardo Tajonar, explained in early March that Mexico needs to adapt its export offering to Asia. He added that it was important for Mexico to strengthen its relationship with China, its third-largest trading partner, to facilitate access for Mexican products, over the current strategy of attracting Chinese investments. Because of USMCA and its adjacency to the United States, Mexico has not taken full advantage of the 12 free trade agreements it has signed with 46 countries, and other commercial agreements it has entered into, and could look for new opportunities under those arrangements.
In January, Mexico and the European Union concluded negotiations to modernize the EU-Mexico global partnership, seeking to deepen and broaden their political dialogue, cooperation, and trade. The deal updates an agreement from 2000, eliminating restrictions in key sectors such as agri-food, services, and public procurement, in addition to incorporating regulations on digital trade and data protection.
Anti-Americanism
Anti-Americanism has been an aspect of both the Canadian and Mexican psyche until about 30 years ago. Scholars on Canada and Mexico have both recently argued that this anti-Americanism had been forced into remission for a generation by NAFTA, but now it is resurgent.
Canadians are voting against tariffs and annexation with their wallets, by boycotting U.S. products, liquor, and vacations to the United States. The U.S. Travel Association says Canada is the top source of international visitors to the United States, with 20.4 million visits in 2024, generating $20.5 billion in spending and supporting 140,000 U.S. jobs. A 10 percent reduction in Canadian travel could mean 2 million fewer visits, $2.1 billion in lost spending, and 14,000 job losses. Canadian air travel to the United States is down 13 percent in February, and travel by car has also seen a sharp decline, with 23 percent fewer Canadians crossing the border. Forward booking data shows that airline ticket bookings are down by over 70 percent in every month through to the end of September 2025.
For their part, Mexicans are reacting in similar ways to Canada. In February, federal authorities, business leaders, creators, innovators, artists, athletes, and prominent members of society gathered in a ceremony at the Ministry of Economy to promote the consumption of "Made in Mexico" products and foster innovation in the national economy. There are calls for boycotts of U.S. companies and products, and to substitute American stores and brands with Mexican ones.
Separate Trade Agreements?
By violating the letter and spirit of USMCA, shaking the foundations of trust that the agreement cemented, and moved by citizens angry with U.S. policies, leaders in both Mexico and Canada will have a difficult time balancing the nationalist currents circulating in their countries with the demands of the Trump administration in future negotiations. It is also possible they will have to do so separately. Prime Minister Carney and President Trump's March 29 telephone conversation, which the latter described as "extremely productive," provides some hints. In President Trump's words, he agreed to meet with whoever wins Canada's election to "work on elements of Politics, Business, and all other factors, that will end up being great for both the United States of America and Canada." Prime Minister Carney said later in the day that the scale of Mr. Trump's efforts to reset American trade relations requires a new deal between Canada and the United States.
This raises the question as to President Trump's strategy with his two neighbors. Is he interested in renegotiating USMCA as a trilateral pact? Or is his preference to deal with Canada and Mexico separately, through two bilateral deals, which would also address irritants not related to trade, like defense arrangements with Canada, including in the Arctic, and migration and drug trafficking from Mexico. He was, after all, prepared in 2018 to sign a deal with Mexico without Canada. And he has shown that he does not like the possibility of trading partners working together to blunt his administration's policies, for instance, threatening to place tariffs "far larger than currently planned" on Canada and the European Union if they coordinate their retaliatory measures. Two bilateral deals would be a nightmare for the highly integrated North American auto sector, as well as other deeply intertwined trilateral supply chains.
Whatever trade agreement(s) emerge once the three countries begin the renegotiation of their commercial relations, one thing is clear: Both Canada and Mexico will want to preserve as much as possible of their relationship with the United States, while simultaneously looking for other partners to lessen their dependence on the United States. Canada and Mexico will make long-term investments in infrastructure to facilitate access to non-U.S. markets. Instead of working together to build "Fortress North America," the three countries could become less integrated, making them less than the sum of their parts in a much more fraught geopolitical world.
Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and senior fellow of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/effects-trump-administrations-tariff-threats-against-canada-and-mexico
[Category: ThinkTank]